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Abstract
This article examines the question: Does regulatory approval of prospectuses act
as a “certification” of securities offerings? Rational investors should generally ig-
nore prospectus approval due to its being uninformative regarding either the
quality of, or motives for, the underlying offering. Our survey experiment demon-
strates that salient references to regulatory oversight in investment advertise-
ments can lead to significant increases in willingness to invest and concomitant
decreases in perceived risks. Conversely, salient disclosure of risk factor informa-
tion increases risk perceptions and reduces the intention to search for additional
information. Various robustness tests confirm that investors can perceive regula-
tory oversight of securities offerings as an endorsement. Our results provide
insight regarding the design of the disclosure and the effective regulation of fi-
nancial marketing.
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1. Introduction
Securities offerings are characterized by asymmetric information between corporate
insiders and the outside investors whose informationally disadvantaged position compro-
mises their ability to assess the credibility of an offering. Two factors, namely publication
of regulatory disclosure, and certification by trusted third parties, including bankers, audi-
tors, or certain selling investors (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
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and Schleifer, 2006), can help investors to make credible assessments when access to inside
information is limited.1
This article examines whether investors perceive regulators’ disclosure of legally
required prospectus approval, in the form of simple references in marketing materials, as a
form of third-party certification. Although investment marketing is widely used by individ-
ual investors for decision- making purposes (Investment Company Institute, 2006), regula-
tory approval of the prospectus only indicates that minimum disclosure requirements have
been met; regulatory prospectus approval is largely uninformative regarding the motives or
merits of the offering. The latter qualities are customarily assessed by analysts or under-
writers in an equity story. A rational investor should distinguish between these different
certification signals, and we should find investors’ decisions to be insensitive to the presence
of regulatory oversight. We empirically investigate the validity of this claim.
Our first step is to review the specific ways investment advertisements refer to regulatory
oversight. In a sample of eighteen advertisements, we find that the majority contain salient
references to regulatory oversight and specifically emphasize “approval.” Salient references
to regulatory oversight can act as a certification of the offering (Gupta, 1997); however,
these references can also lower the responsiveness to other attributes competing for atten-
tion (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2013). In this case, risk factor disclosure would be
such an attribute. Therefore, the design of advertising disclosures can help issuers influence
investor behavior as well as reduce the cost of newly raised capital. A reduction in the sali-
ency of risk factor information improves the investor’s perceptions of the offering and,
therefore, increases its probability of success. Consistent with Jones and Smythe (2003),
our review confirms that risk factor information tends to be disclosed in fine print sections
of the advertisement with low visual saliency.
Next, we conduct a survey experiment in which references to regulatory oversight in
advertisements vary in saliency, and in which relevant background information is collected.
The treatments are designed in cooperation with the supervision staff of the Dutch financial
markets regulator (AFM—the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets), who then
administered the survey. As a result, and despite not being able to provide monetary partici-
pation incentives to all respondents, we obtained access to a unique sample of investors ac-
tive in the primary market. We concede the imperfections inherent in our sample, and
further note that relevant alternative research strategies have distinct drawbacks. For ex-
ample, we could not conduct a field experiment that would necessitate investors’ receiving
different treatments, as this method would violate the law requiring offering homogeneous
information to all investors to ensure a level playing field. Offering different information
documents to investors creates liability risks for supervisory authorities or issuing firms.
Similarly, cross-sectional or longitudinal field data on retail securities offerings are scarce
and typically contain only limited background information on investors.
Our main findings are summarized as follows. First, we find that the treatments are
associated with significant increases in willingness to invest (þ10%) and decreases in risk
1 In the USA, an S-1 form is filed with the SEC prior to offering securities to the public. Similar legisla-
tion applies to European capital markets where regulators assess whether a prospectus is
“complete,” “consistent,” and “understandable” prior to granting approval (Prospectus Directive
2003/71/EU). Exempted offerings are obliged to carry a salient warning of a prescribed size. Finally,
prospectuses are approved prior to publication, while regulators are only mandated to supervise
investment marketing after it has been published.
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perceptions (5.9%). The causality of these findings is confirmed in a within-subject-
within-offering analysis in which changes in disclosure are regressed on changes in investor
responses. Second, salient risk factor disclosure increases (decreases) investors’ risk percep-
tions (search for additional information), but does not affect willingness to invest or
amounts invested. Third, we further investigate whether the certification mechanism is
affected by investor experience or investor sophistication. These analyses reveal that experi-
enced investors seem to delegate trust to the regulator and, with this evidence of regulatory
oversight, are less likely to search for additional information. Additional interaction ana-
lysis with education or wealth measures does not generate additional insight regarding sen-
sitivity to regulatory certification. Finally, regulatory certification does not affect the
intention to consult the prospectus; however, the demand for additional information seems
driven in part by the information provided by the advertisements. This latter finding is con-
sistent with Mayzlin and Shin (2011), who show that advertisements can be designed to in-
vite the consumer to search for additional information.
This article makes a unique contribution to the literature through testing the effect of
regulatory certification in investment marketing on investment behavior. We extend the
current literature by empirically demonstrating that visual salient disclosure of regulatory
certification has a significant effect on investor opinions and thus their intended investment
decisions.2 Although the impact of saliency of information on investment decisions has
received empirical support (Klibanoff, Lamont and Wizman, 2002; Barber and Odean,
2008), this method of analysis has not heretofore been performed in a regulatory context.
Because supervisors have a prominent presence in financial markets, understanding the ef-
fect of the externalities of regulatory oversight on investor behavior and, ultimately, on
securities prices, is crucial. We also document a new channel of certification by third parties
in securities offerings. Although previous contributions have examined third-party certifica-
tion by market parties such as (i) the presence of private equity investors (Megginson and
Weiss, 1991); (ii) prominent strategic partners (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999); and (iii)
the composition of the underwriting syndicate (Booth and Smith, 1986), the presence of
regulators has until now been neglected. Although regulatory oversight may provide basic
assurance for the intentions or quality of an issuer or offering, our study documents large
effects in comparison to the risk of, for example, a scam.
Our use of a survey experiment also allows for an analysis at the individual investor
level, thereby enabling us to correct for confounding factors. Even absent field data, our
certification findings corroborate those established with event studies (Gupta, 1997).
Moreover, our data set is representative of the (Dutch) investor population, which allows
us to examine the extent of investor sensitivity to regulatory certification. Further, the avail-
ability of background information informs how sensitivity varies with investor sophistica-
tion. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first researchers to conduct an empirical
examination at this level of detail.
A further contribution entails our studying offerings specifically targeted toward retail
investors. Existing studies often cover the offerings that receive substantial external atten-
tion from media and analysts (Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011; Solomon, Soltes, and
Sosyura, 2014). These deals are typically underwritten by, or distributed through, promin-
ent channels such as investment banks or wealth managers, in which case they receive
2 See Loughran and McDonald (2013); Lawrence (2013); Beshears et al. (2011); and Choi, Laibson,
and Madrian (2010) for empirical disclosure research.










 user on 14 January 2021
implicit certification regardless of the presence of regulatory oversight. Retail offerings are
a small but important niche in the capital market, because they are characterized by high
asymmetric information between issuers and investors. They are also customarily sold with-
out the intervention of trust-enhancing intermediaries, while fraudulent retail investment
offerings attract substantial media attention and consequently drive public opinion regard-
ing the integrity of the capital market and the effectiveness of its regulators. Finally, exter-
nal analysts provide only limited coverage of retail offerings, which limits availability of
information outside the direct control of the issuing firm. Therefore, regulatory certification
can provide an important credibility signal to investors. Our study examines the specific
segment of the capital market where these factors are likely to be most significant.
From a policy perspective, our findings provide important insights into the effects of fi-
nancial markets regulation. Individual investors rely heavily on marketing materials for
decision-making purposes and forgo consulting the prospectus (SEC, 1983; Investment
Company Institute, 2006; SEC, 2009). However, marketing materials tend to be supervised
following publication, and their content is less regulated in comparison to the prospectus,
which is approved prior to publication. This difference creates an opportunity for issuers to
frame information on regulatory oversight toward certification in order to let an offer suc-
ceed. Framing of this kind comes at the expense of conflicting with the interests of invest-
ors, who bear increasing responsibility for the welfare impact of costly investment
mistakes. Moreover, regulatory approval may be used as a stand-alone decision criterion,
in which case financial market supervision can reduce the quantity of fundamental informa-
tion ultimately reflected in investment decisions. Finally, the increased regulation of finan-
cial markets, especially following the Global Financial Crisis, implies that the side-effects of
regulatory oversight are more widespread than previously thought. An example is the
SEC’s designation of credit rating agencies (CRAs) as nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations (NRSROs) following the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. This act
imposed stricter requirements for obtaining the NRSRO designation, thereby raising the
question whether ratings by regulated NRSROs should merit investors’ trust to a greater
degree than would ratings by institutions without this designation.
The presence of regulatory externalities further raises the questions: Whether, and how,
can regulations be reformed to reduce them? Framing of regulatory oversight may be
reduced by a stricter regulation of references, such as harmonization. Although this action
could eliminate the discriminatory value, it would not alleviate the risk of regulatory appro-
val’s being a stand-alone decision heuristic for investors. Consequently, investors may per-
ceive a disadvantage in offerings exempted from the prospectus regulation.3 Two possible
factors may mitigate the heuristic effect: one, if investors are better informed about the roles
and tasks of regulatory authorities; or two, by elimination of exemptions to the prospectus
regime such that all offerings are treated at par from a regulatory perspective. However,
both interventions create new regulatory costs, such as those of educating investors and
supervising a larger number of offerings. As a result, new barriers to entry in the capital
markets may arise. Finally, the decision to intervene should be driven by an assessment of
3 Various exemptions apply to the requirement to publish a prospectus including the number of
investors that the securities are offered to (150 investors or fewer), the nominal value of the secur-
ities (more than e100,000), and the size of the offering (less than e2.5 million). The majority of
exempted offerings use the e2.5 million exemption.
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the costs of compliance and supervision against the welfare losses, if any, sustained in the
current situation. This detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this article.
This article continues with an overview of the literature, and hypotheses development,
in Section 2, followed by a discussion of the design of the study in Section 3. Our empirical
findings are contained in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our findings and Section 6
concludes.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Disclosure laws reduce the information asymmetry between investors and corporate
insiders in capital-raising activities by requiring the publication of a detailed disclosure
regarding a given securities offering. However, the disclosure in prospectuses tends to be
extensive and complex (Investment Company Institute, 2006), and individual investors are
limited in the quantity and complexity of information they can effectively process (Van
Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011; Lawrence, 2013). As a result, investors rely heavily on al-
ternative sources of information such as advertisements and roadshow materials, in which
information is more accessible but is not comprehensive.
The typical appeal of advertising to investors is the concise and attention-grabbing for-
mat of the information. Despite the advertisements’ acknowledged dual purpose of inform-
ing and attracting attention, they are not legally required to contain all relevant
information regarding a product or offering. This condition implies that issuing firms can
choose the information they include in advertisements and thereby make salient to invest-
ors. Prior studies show that marketing affects investment decisions because it increases the
saliency of the advertised firm. Barber and Odean (2008) show that media coverage directs
investor attention to salient securities and causes a temporary increase in investor demand
for stocks covered in the news. Similarly, Solomon et al. (2014) find that mutual funds cov-
ered in the media attract flows from investors in contrast to holdings not covered in major
newspapers. Moreover, media coverage also tends to contribute to returns-chasing behav-
ior. Lou (2014) provides evidence that managers adjust firm advertising to attract investor
attention and influence short-term stock returns. He shows that increased advertising
spending correlates with an initial rise in retail buying and positive abnormal stock returns
followed by lower future returns. A theoretical model explaining these empirical findings is
developed in Bordalo et al. (2013), who show that salient information attains a greater
weight in subsequent decision-making compared to nonsalient attributes. However, the
studies described above focus on advertising and media coverage of the mutual fund sector
rather than initial public offerings targeted to retail investors, for which such an analysis is
lacking.
In addition to the saliency of firms and information created by advertisements and dis-
closure, (salient) third-party certification can provide valuable signals about the quality of
an offer and the intentions of an issuer in the presence of asymmetric information. The cer-
tification channel acts through the reputation, activities, or intentions from third parties,
including the composition and reputation of underwriting syndicates in securities offerings.
Booth and Smith (1986) demonstrate that the reputational capital of the underwriting syn-
dicate in an IPO affects IPO underpricing and announcement effects, and thereby acts as a
certification mechanism. Similarly, Megginson and Weiss (1991) show that the presence of
selling venture capital shareholders in IPOs results in significantly lower initial returns and
less underpricing compared to non-VC-backed deals. The total costs of going public are
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lowered by the presence of venture capitalists and thereby maximize the net proceeds to the
offering firm. Both studies show the existence and economic importance of third-party cer-
tification effects in securities offerings.
Another paper closely related to ours is Gupta (1997), who investigates regulatory certi-
fication effects by conducting an event study using a sample of bank bailouts approved by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Gupta finds that acquirers of failed
banks who obtain prior regulatory approval by the FDIC have acquirer gains exceeding the
size of the acquired deposit base. This finding indicates that FDIC approval provides valu-
able information regarding the financial health of the acquirer. Moreover, the documented
effects increase in periods of economic turmoil, when uncertainty about the health of finan-
cial institutions increases. Certification effects are not confined to securities offerings or
takeover bids, but are also present in the market for credit ratings, where credit rating agen-
cies (CRAs) analyse the credit risk of fixed-income securities. Boot, Milbourn, and
Schmeits (2006) show that individual investors mimic the decisions of institutional invest-
ors, who in turn follow credit ratings. In this case, the investment decisions are certified by
a combination of large investors and CRAs. Similarly, Bongaerts, Cremers, and Goetzmann
(2012) demonstrate empirically the existence of “regulatory certification,” in which a third
rating agency determines whether a bond is classified as investment grade and high yield, or
relegated to junk status.
Overall, extant finance literature documents that the saliency of information is an im-
portant driver for investment behavior, and the presence of third-party certification is an
important piece of information, which can be made salient. However, the existing literature
has assessed such effects generally from a market-level perspective for certification by other
market parties. Our article contributes to the literature on the two following dimensions:
one, via analyzing the effects of certification at the individual investor level; and two, via
testing certification by a public body. Although NRSROs are also certified by a public
body, namely the SEC, we are not aware of empirical work that analyses the impact on in-
dividual investor behavior.
We therefore investigate the following hypotheses. First, we expect that salient regula-
tory certification has a positive influence on investor perceptions surrounding an offering
and decreases the perceived riskiness of the offering.4 Moreover, we expect regulatory certi-
fication to increase the willingness to invest, as well as the specific amounts invested and
the intention to search for additional information. With respect to the latter, we note that
the direction of the effect is ambiguous. If investors believe that the availability of certified
information is sufficient for an investment decision, then the investor may require less add-
itional information, resulting in a small effect or no effect. However, as noted previously,
investment marketing only contains a subset of information; therefore, a rational investor
would still require additional information after having read the advertisement. In this case,
certification can increase awareness about prospectus availability, and subsequently affect
investors’ intentions to and the number of investors that search for additional information.
Overall, we formulate the first set of hypotheses as follows:
Hypotheses 1: Regulatory certification: (a) decreases perceived riskiness; (b) increases willing-
ness to invest; (c) increases the average amount invested; (d) positively affects the intention to
4 Note that this claim assumes the regulator holds a positive image among the investment audience.
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search for additional information; and (e) increases the inclination of investors to search for
additional information.
Next, we examine how risk factor disclosure affects investors. Although regulations re-
quire risk information to be included in advertisements, this information can be disclosed
with low visual or verbal saliency (Jones and Smythe, 2003). Bertrand et al. (2010) find
that minor differences in verbal saliency can significantly affect consumer demand.
Therefore, we expect the risk perception of potential investors to be sensitive to the verbal
(e.g., including the word “risk” in risk factor descriptions) and visual saliency (e.g., disclos-
ure in fine print) of risk factor disclosure. How saliency of risk-factor disclosure affects in-
formation search behavior remains ambiguous. If the advertisement spurs investors’
curiosity, then search efforts might increase; however, if investors lose interest in the offer-
ing, then a negative effect is probable. The saliency of risk-factor disclosure also affects its
weight in subsequent decisions (Bordalo et al., 2013). Consequently, we expect that
increasing (decreasing) the relative saliency of risk attributes decreases (increases) the ap-
peal of the offering; decreases (increases) the willingness to invest; and increases (decreases)
risk perceptions. These arguments lead us to formulate the second set of hypotheses as
follows:
Hypotheses 2a/b: Explicit verbal and visual disclosure (a) increases perceived riskiness; (b)
decreases willingness to invest; (c) decreases the average amount invested; (d) ambiguously
affects the intention to search for additional information; and (e) ambiguously affects the inclin-
ation of investors to search for additional information.
As explained in the introduction, we conduct a survey experiment instead of a field ex-
periment for legal reasons. We aim to maximize the external validity of our approach
through random assignment of respondents and the development of realistic treatments.
A more extensive discussion of the external validity of our findings is included in the discus-
sion section. The next section develops a detailed description of our research design.
3. Research Design
3.1 Design of the Advertisement
The advertisements for the hypothetical securities offerings used in this article have been
designed in collaboration with the Dutch financial markets regulator (AFM) to assure their
resemblance to actual offerings. Using hypothetical offerings has several advantages: First,
they are not traceable to actual offerings in the market, thereby obviating (regulatory) se-
crecy issues. Second, hypothetical offerings reduce the risk of responses being contaminated
by unobserved past experiences or familiarity with the offering. Third and finally, hypothet-
ical offerings are necessarily exempt from concurrent media attention that could confound
our results.
We create our advertisements based on a review of eighteen actual offering advertise-
ments for which an approved prospectus has been published. These advertisements were
published on popular investor websites as well as in a major Dutch financial newspaper
that also contains advertisements for prospectus-exempt offerings. Since the two channels
attract a diverse readership including both retail and professional investors, we contend
that our sample of advertisements is representative of those encountered by typical Dutch
retail investors. We develop two one-page advertisement templates, and include layout
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features from actual advertisements. Both templates are included in Figures A.I and A.II of
the Online Appendix.
Next, we analyze the disclosure in the advertisements using Resnik and Stern’s (1977)
framework to identify “informational cues.” These informational cues are pieces of infor-
mation likely to affect investor behavior. Cues include (i) price (nominal amount or price of
a bond or stock); (ii) quality (experience of the fund manager or qualities of the underlying
asset); (iii) performance (track record, historical performance, or expected returns); (iv)
guarantees (guaranteed repayments of the bond principal); and (v) safety information (risks
associated with an investment and the presence of regulatory oversight). Unsurprisingly, we
find that performance (returns) and safety cues (reference to regulatory oversight) are
included in all of the advertisements.5 Risk-factor disclosure is also part of all the advertise-
ments, but typically disclosed with low verbal (e.g., vaguely worded) or visual (e.g., in fine
print) saliency. Consider as an example the description of liquidity risk. A portion of adver-
tisements describe this risk factor as “limited possibilities to trade your securities,” while a
more straightforward description would be “liquidity risk means that you risk not being
able to trade your securities” [emphasis added]. The former description is less salient to re-
tail investors. Similarly, we find that favorable attributes, such as returns, are presented in
colored and attention grabbing box formats, which increases their relative visual saliency.
We then constructed two bond offerings that mimic actual offerings: one for a food mar-
ket fund (A), and one for a sports fund (B). As a result, we offered a fixed-rate coupon
bond with a denomination of e1,000, a 4-year (A) or 4.5-year (B) maturity, and an annual
coupon of 7.2% (A) or 7.6% (B). Because these propositions are typically highly levered,
high coupon rates were offered to compensate for the default risks. Further, because excep-
tionally high coupon rates raise suspicion, we verified that our rates were equivalent to
(risky) SME bond yields (Zank, Schilz, and Bund, 2015). Note that these bonds have been
issued at face value and not via a book-building procedure such that the initial yields are
equal to the coupon rates. Thus, the success of the offering would depend solely upon the
amount of successfully placed securities and not upon their price.
In the last step, we drafted eight different Dutch advertisements, four for each bond-
offering template. The header and shrouded sections of the advertisement contain context-
ual and risk factor information alongside a reference to regulatory oversight of the prospec-
tus. This information was kept constant across advertisements. We used a salient section to
increase the visual saliency of information regarding the presence of regulatory oversight
and risk factors. Since our panel consisted of Dutch investors, we presented them with
advertisements in Dutch and provide English translations in Table A.I (sports fund) and
Table A.II (food market) of the Online Appendix.
The sports fund advertisement alternatives (Figure A.III–Figure A.VI in the Online
Appendix) vary the amount of visually salient risk factors included in the salient section of
the advertisement and are referred to as the Balanced Information treatment. The food
market advertisements (Figure A.VI–Figure A.X in the Online Appendix) vary the verbal sa-
liency of the risk factor descriptions (e.g., using the word “risk”) and we refer to this treat-
ment as Explicit Risk Disclosure. Both offerings contain references to regulatory
certification and we refer to this treatment as Regulatory Certification.
5 Note that although all investors may not have known the transcription for AFM, i.e., Dutch
Authority for the Financial Markets, we refrained from transcribing the acronym, to remain consist-
ent with usage in actual advertisements.










 user on 14 January 2021
Note that differences in coloring and other changes can also affect investor behavior
(Kliger and Gilad, 2012). However, we faced a trade-off between keeping the experimental
conditions constant and creating advertisements that attract a sufficient amount of atten-
tion. Therefore, the different color schemes for the food market and sports fund advertise-
ments are based on existing advertisements. Furthermore, fund manager experience has
been included in some of the sports fund advertisements in order to present the same num-
ber of characteristics in the salient section as in other advertisements (see Figure A.V and
A.VI in the Online Appendix).6 These changes lead to small deviations from the ceteris par-
ibus condition, yet they have ensured that the advertisements remain realistic and in line
with current (interpretations of) regulations.
3.2 Design of the Survey Experiment
Respondents read a brief introductory text and then began the experiment. They clicked to
view the first of three randomly assigned advertisements, each of which was followed by a
brief four-question survey discussed below. We imposed two conditions on the assignment
of advertisements. First, we required that respondents encounter advertisements for both
propositions, and second, we required the first and third advertisements to be different
advertisements for the same proposition. The first condition was imposed to obviate the
possibility that investors would ignore information by incorrectly assuming that they previ-
ously saw the same advertisement, while the latter condition created within-respondent-
within-offering variation in disclosure allowing for a difference-in-differences analysis. The
graphical setup of the experiment is presented in Figure 1.
We imposed no restrictions on the time that respondents could spend reading the adver-
tisement, and we measured their viewing time until they began the questionnaire.
Respondents answered survey questions one at a time, and were unable to click back to the
advertisement or to previous questions, to prevent look-up behavior or changes to initial
answers.
The four questions that respondents addressed measure the following: (i) willingness to
invest; (ii) amount invested from a hypothetical e25,000 endowment; (iii) inclination to
search for other information; and (iv) perceived riskiness of the offering (see questionnaire
in Appendix). We adopted question formats and measurement scales from Aydogdu and
Wellman (2011) and Miyazaki and Krishnamurthy (2002). To mitigate response noise, the
survey was designed in order that only those participants expressing interest in the offering,
via a response of three or higher on the willingness to invest question, were then asked to
indicate their hypothetical investment sum.7 After the third round, we also asked two exit
questions about the respondents’ primary market investment experience and their inclin-
ation to read the statutory prospectus (see the Appendix).
6 Fund manager experience is also included in the shrouded section of the advertisement. While this
does not yield a perfect ceteris paribus condition, a comparison of mean responses between
Online Appendix Figures A.V and A.VI reveals that they remain consistent with the regulatory certi-
fication hypothesis.
7 Our results are not sensitive to this cutoff point. The response distribution of the willingness to in-
vest question is homogeneous between Answer Categories 3, 4, and 5, and a moderate correlation
exists between willingness to invest and amount invested (q ¼ 0.15). These findings indicate that
our results are not driven by the cutoff value.
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The experiment was administered online in May 2015, by a specialized marketing re-
search bureau, to a panel of Dutch investors with heterogeneous experience levels. The
demographic data of the respondents were collected when they enrolled in the panel and
not collected again in this study. Our data consist of individuals who volunteered to enroll
in the panel, and a random sample obtained from a large panel operated by the marketing
research bureau (hereafter MRB). The latter group is more representative of the Dutch
population. Respondents were informed that the AFM was involved in the study, which
created a risk that only those respondents who hold positive views about the regulator
would choose to participate. Unfortunately, we were unable to reliably control for these
perceptions, and we acknowledge the potential for upward bias in the regulatory certifica-
tion effect. However, these effects should be weaker for the MRB respondents, who were
sourced from an external panel.
Respondents from the marketing research bureau also received monetary compensation
for their participation in the study, while the voluntarily enrolled respondents participated
in a semiannual lottery to win a lunch with AFM’s CEO. Although volunteers received no
monetary participation for their participation, we note that lottery-type incentives have
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the experimental design. The experimental procedure randomly con-
fronts respondents consecutively with three advertisements each followed by a four-question survey
(denoted by Q1–Q4). Respondents randomly encounter one of four advertisements (denoted by 1–4)
for the food market (denoted by A) or sports fund proposition (denoted by B) per round. We impose
the condition that: (1) the second round advertisement is a different proposition than the first round
advertisement (e.g., A followed by B) and (2) that the third round advertisement is a different alterna-
tive compared to the first round (e.g., one followed by three). As an example, Respondent #2 views
sports fund alternative two (B.2) in the first round, food market alternative three (A.3) in the second
round, and sports fund alternative one (B.1) in the third round. The allocation of respondents to adver-
tisements is independent of their origination source. The questionnaire is provided in the Appendix
and the advertisements are present in the Online Appendix.
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been used in similar studies (Kozup, Howlett, and Pagano, 2008; Elliott, Rennekamp, and
White, 2015). Since the heterogeneous composition of our sample also affects awareness of




Of the 1,840 invitations distributed by email, 1,125 respondents completed the experiment,
which corresponds to a response rate of 61.1%. Ten respondents spent more than
1,000 seconds to view one or more of the advertisements and we treat those observations as
outliers and winsorize them to 1,000 seconds. This does not affect our results.
We present the demographic characteristics in Table I and find that our sample is pri-
marily composed of married men (80.1%) without children living at home (54.5%). Nearly
85% of the respondents are age 45 years or above and 31.2% earn an income at least dou-
ble that of the Dutch median (e66,000 in 2015). The amount of wealth available for finan-
cial investments exhibits a U-shape with relatively few observations between e25,000 and
e80,000. In line with the high average age of our respondents, Table I indicates that 40%
of them are retired, while the majority of nonretired respondents are regularly employed
(29.1%).
Examining differences across subsamples reveals that the marketing research bureau
respondents are, on average, younger (55% are less than 60 years old), and report less
wealth and lower income. Moreover, they are less likely to be entrepreneurs (6.0%) com-
pared to the volunteer respondents (21.1%). Note that our sample is not representative of
the Dutch population as a whole, but shares similar characteristics to studies using repre-
sentative Dutch survey data (Gaudecker, 2015).
Descriptive statistics on the response variables are provided in Table II, in which Panel
A contains the Explicit Risk Disclosure treatment (N¼ 562), Panel B covers the Balanced
Information treatment (N¼563), and Panels A and B both contain the Regulatory
Certification treatment. Clear differences emerge across all treatment conditions while
being strongest for the regulatory certification effect. For ease of comparison, we provide
aggregated responses at the treatment group level in Panel C, and significant differences in
means are bolded.
Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the presence of the visually salient regula-
tory certification reduces perceived risk (6.4%) and increases willingness to invest
(þ10.2%). No significant differences in investment amounts are observed as a result of the
relatively low average interest in the offering. This leads, by construction, to a lower num-
ber of observations for the amount invested question (N¼ 254). We also find that the
amount invested responses deviate from the e1,000 nominal bond value, which could indi-
cate that the respondents failed to understand the mechanics of these investments or did not
carefully read the advertisement.8 We control for the latter in a robustness analysis by add-
ing analysis time as an additional explanatory variable.
Inclusion of the verbally salient risk factor descriptions increases the average risk per-
ceptions by 5.1% and reduces the willingness to consult other information by 6.8% (see
8 Although we ran all of the regressions on the subsample of respondents who spent at least
30 seconds reading the advertisement, the results do not affect our results.
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Table I. Demographic and socioeconomic descriptive statistics
This table contains the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the complete data
set, as well as the voluntary enrollment and marketing research bureau subsamples. All varia-







Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Male 80.1% 39.9% 87.0% 32.3% 76.3% 42.5%
Single w/o children 20.2% 40.0% 15.6% 35.8% 21.8% 41.3%
Single w/ children 2.2% 14.7% 1.8% 13.4% 2.4% 15.3%
Spouse w/o children 54.5% 49.8% 55.6% 49.7% 54.5% 49.8%
Spouse w/ children 21.6% 41.2% 24.1% 42.1% 20.2% 40.2%
Other 1.6% 12.6% 2.9% 16.3% 1.1% 10.5%
Age  30 years 1.3% 11.5% 0.5% 5.1% 1.7% 12.9%
Age 31  45 years 11.1% 31.5% 10.8% 30.6% 11.3% 31.7%
Age 46  60 years 36.2% 48.1% 33.4% 46.4% 38.1% 48.6%
Age 61  75 years 42.8% 49.5% 45.2% 48.2% 41.2% 49.2%
Age > 75 years 5.5% 22.8% 6.8% 25.2% 4.6% 21.0%
Income  e12.500 2.0% 14.2% 0.7% 5.8% 2.7% 16.1%
Income e 12.501  e26.500 8.3% 27.6% 4.2% 17.9% 10.3% 30.4%
Income e 26.501  e33.000 8.6% 28.1% 7.0% 25.2% 9.3% 29.0%
Income e 33.001  e39.500 10.7% 31.0% 8.8% 28.0% 11.4% 31.8%
Income e 39.501  e66.000 27.2% 44.5% 22.8% 41.8% 28.8% 45.3%
Income e 66.000  e78.500 10.5% 30.7% 11.4% 31.7% 10.5% 30.7%
Income > e 78.500 20.7% 40.5% 29.6% 45.4% 17.0% 37.6%
DK income 11.9% 32.4% 15.6% 36.3% 10.1% 30.2%
Household wealth  e 10.000 17.8% 38.2% 9.9% 26.9% 21.9% 41.4%
Household wealth e 10.000  e25.000 11.1% 31.4% 7.5% 23.2% 12.2% 32.8%
Household wealth e 25.001  e50.000 13.6% 34.3% 9.0% 27.9% 15.9% 36.6%
Household wealth e 50.001  e80.000 8.6% 28.1% 7.4% 26.1% 9.1% 28.8%
Household wealth e 80.001  e150.000 10.5% 30.7% 9.7% 29.7% 11.0% 31.3%
Household wealth > e150.000 22.0% 41.5% 37.8% 46.6% 14.7% 35.5%
DK household wealth 16.3% 37.0% 18.7% 39.1% 15.2% 35.9%
Primary school/lower vocational studies 10.2% 30.3% 8.1% 26.7% 11.1% 31.4%
High school/middle vocational studies 29.1% 45.4% 19.0% 39.4% 34.8% 47.7%
College/university level education 60.7% 48.9% 72.9% 44.6% 54.1% 49.9%
Entrepreneur 10.2% 30.3% 18.5% 38.8% 6.0% 23.8%
Employee 29.1% 45.4% 26.7% 42.4% 31.6% 46.5%
Government employee 5.3% 22.5% 2.5% 13.6% 6.6% 24.8%
Employment disabled 6.4% 24.5% 3.9% 17.2% 7.3% 26.0%
Unemployed 4.1% 19.8% 2.3% 13.2% 4.8% 21.3%
Retired 40.2% 49.1% 41.4% 47.2% 39.0% 48.8%
Student 0.1% 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 5.3%
House(wo)man 2.5% 15.6% 2.1% 12.7% 2.8% 16.5%
Other 1.9% 13.9% 2.6% 15.6% 1.5% 12.3%
Number of observations 1,125 413 712
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Table II. Descriptive statistics by treatment conditions
This table presents the means and standard deviations of the first round responses across
treatment conditions: regulatory certification (both panels), explicit risk disclosure (Panel A),
and balanced information (Panel B). Panel C reports the mean values across the treatment
groups and indicates p-values  0.05 for the two-sided differences-in-means tests in bold. Risk
Perception (Question 4) is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “not risky at all” to
7 “very risky.” Willingness-to-invest (Question 1) is measured on a seven-point scale ranging
from 1 “certainly not investing” to 7 “certainly investing.” Consult Other Information (Question
2) is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “certainly not consulting other
information” to 7 “certainly consulting other information” and Amount Invested (Question 3a)
is measured on a continuous scale ranging between e0 and 25,000. Analysis Time is the num-
ber of seconds the respondent spent reading the advertisement. The questionnaire can be
found in the Appendix.
Panel A: Regulatory certification and explicit risk disclosure (food market)
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4
Regulatory certification: Yes No Yes No
Explicit risk disclosure: No No Yes Yes
Avg. Std. Avg. Std. Avg. Std. Avg. Std.
Risk perception 5.1 1.5 5.5 1.3 5.3 1.3 5.8 1.2
Willingness-to-invest 2.4 1.6 2.3 1.4 2.4 1.5 2.0 1.3
Amount invested e 6.722 e 4.356 e 5.844 e 5.791 e 7.000 e 3.642 e 7.083 e 5.532
Consult other information 5.2 2.5 5.2 2.5 5.0 2.5 4.7 2.6
Analysis time 53.3 41.2 60.7 66.4 58.5 78.9 62.5 104.3
Number of observations 141 141 140 140
Panel B: Regulatory certification and balanced information (sports fund)
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4
Regulatory certification: Yes No Yes No
Balanced information: Yes Yes No No
Avg. Std. Avg. Std. Avg. Std. Avg. Std.
Risk perception 5.3 1.2 5.7 1.3 5.4 1.4 5.5 1.3
Willingness-to-invest 2.2 1.4 2.0 1.3 2.4 1.6 2.3 1.5
Amount invested e 6.550 e 4.288 e 5.574 e 4.887 e 6.500 e 4.900 e 4.910 e 3.638
Consult other information 4.8 2.5 4.8 2.7 5.2 2.4 5.4 2.4
Analysis time 60.7 120.1 61.2 93.7 53.2 36.4 47.9 33.8
Number of observations 141 141 141 140
Panel C: Mean responses across treatment conditions (p-values < 0.05 indicated in bold)
Treatment condition: Regulatory certification Explicit risk disclosure Balanced information
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Risk perception 5.27 5.63 5.56 5.29 5.50 5.46
(continued)
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Panel C) compared to the reference group who received more vaguely described disclosure.
Although the former result is consistent with our hypotheses, the latter seems to indicate
that the respondents were either no longer interested in the proposition or believed they
were sufficiently informed. Furthermore, the visually salient presentation of the risk factors
(Panel B) significantly reduces the willingness to invest and search for additional informa-
tion (Panel C). Again, this finding is consistent with our hypothesis that increasing the sali-
ency of the undesirable attributes decreases the attractiveness of the offering.
4.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis
We conduct OLS regressions and include control variables based on Van Rooij et al. (2011)
due to the similarity in data and research questions. Our model includes controls for demo-
graphics (age, family situation, education, gender, and labor market position); financial
characteristics (income and wealth); and the type of respondent and the offering.
Condensed regression results are reported in Table III.
Panel A indicates that regulatory certification indeed decreases risk perceptions by
5.6%, while increasing the willingness to invest and the amount invested by 10.3% and
e1,029, respectively. We obtain marginal effect sizes by dividing the regression coefficient
by the average response for the nontreated control group (see Table II Panel C). As indi-
cated, smaller sample sizes for the amount invested model are caused by the design of the
survey, due to only interested participants having been asked to indicate an amount.
Overall, our results indicate that regulatory certification has a significant impact on invest-
or behavior.
The magnitude of the effects also indicates that regulatory certification carries greater
weight in decision making relative to the risk factor information. Although verbal salience
of risk factors (Explicit Risk Description) increases risk perceptions by 4.3% and decreases
the intention to search for additional information by 7.3%, these effects are less significant
(compare Table III Panel A with Panel B). Finally, Panel C reports that increasing the visual
saliency of the risk factor disclosure decreases investors’ willingness to search for additional
information by 9.7%.
It is unclear why the effect of risk factor disclosure is smaller, as it is a key input for in-
vestment decisions. One explanation is that the presence of regulatory oversight reduces
investors’ sensitivity to other information contained in the advertisement. If investors only
screen for the presence of regulatory oversight, then merely changing the saliency, which is
included in every advertisement, would result in smaller effects. We test this explanation by
estimating the interaction between regulatory certification and risk disclosure in Table III
Table II. Continued
Panel C: Mean responses across treatment conditions (p-values < 0.05 indicated in bold)
Treatment condition: Regulatory certification Explicit risk disclosure Balanced information
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Willingness-to-invest 2.35 2.14 2.20 2.36 2.10 2.33
Amount invested e 6,687 e 5,768 e 7,035 e 6,330 e 6,169 e 5,715
Consult other information 5.04 5.02 4.84 5.19 4.79 5.32
Analysis time 56.4 59.7 60.5 60.3 50.5 61.0
Number of observations 563 562 280 282 282 281
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Table III. Multivariate regression analysis of first round responses
This table contains the results for the OLS regressions. The dependent variables are Risk
Perception (Question 4) measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “not risky at all” to 7
“very risky,” Willingness-to-invest (Question 1) measured on a seven-point scale ranging from
1 “certainly not investing” to 7 “certainly investing,” Consult Other Information (Question 2)
measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “certainly not consulting other information”
to 7 “certainly consulting other information,” and Amount Invested (Question 3a) measured on
a continuous scale ranging between e0 and 25,000. The questionnaire is contained in the
Appendix. Panel A includes a dummy variable, Regulatory Certification, that is equal to one if a
salient reference to the regulator is included in the advertisement and zero otherwise. Panel B
includes a dummy variable, Explicit Risk Disclosure, that is equal to one if the risk description
contains the word “risk” and zero otherwise. Panel C includes a dummy variable, Balanced
Information, that is equal to one if risk disclosure is included in the salient section of the adver-
tisement and zero otherwise. Panel D includes the interaction between Explicit Risk Disclosure
and Regulatory Certification, while Panel E includes the interaction between Balanced
Information and Regulatory Certification. First round responses are used and the control varia-
bles are listed in Table I. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. Significance is indicated by









Panel A: Regulatory certification treatment
Regulatory certification 0.319*** 0.222** 1029.5* 0.097
[4.01] [2.55] [1.74] [0.66]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 1,125 1,125 254 1,125
R2 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.08
F-statistic 23.89 2.89 1.61 3.48
Panel B: Explicit risk disclosure treatment
Explicit risk disclosure 0.227* 0.142 820.2 0.379*
[1.96] [1.15] [0.69] [1.80]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 562 562 121 562
R2 0.11 0.10 0.27 0.11
F-statistic 2.68 2.40 119 2.66
Panel C: Balanced information treatment
Balanced information 0.089 0.179 917.9 0.517**
[0.78] [1.45] [0.92] [2.40]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 563 563 133 563
R2 0.08 0.11 0.24 0.11
F-statistic 13.79 2.36 1.67 2.62
Panel D: Interaction analysis explicit risk disclosure  regulatory certification
Explicit risk disclosure 
regulatory certification
0.039 0.233 1,079.0 0.363
[0.17] [0.91] [0.56] [0.88]
(continued)
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Panels D and E and find similar results. The magnitude of the risk disclosure treatments
increases in the absence of regulatory certification, thereby indicating that investors become
less sensitive to risk factor disclosure once regulatory certification is saliently disclosed in
the advertisements.
Another explanation is that the presence of regulatory oversight increases the hurdle for
attention to risks while the sensitivity to other offering information (e.g., returns) increases.
Sensitivity to (past) returns has received extensive empirical support in the literature (Sirri
and Tufano, 1998; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2009); if investment decisions are only driven
by a subset of information then the factors driving actual decisions (e.g., returns) and per-
ceptions (e.g., risks) may diverge.
In the following sections, we examine how sensitivity to regulatory certification varies
with investors’ sophistication and experience (Section 4.3). We also test the contribution of
advertising content to use of the prospectus (Section 4.4), and establish the causal interpret-
ation of our findings in a within-respondent-within-offer analysis in Section 4.5. Finally,
we test the sensitivity of our results to model specification and selection bias in Section 4.6.
4.3 Analysis of Investor Characteristics
We first analyze the sensitivity of our findings to the different origins of our respondents.
As previously noted, the origin of the investor proxies for participation incentives and
awareness of and familiarity with regulatory duties. If only those respondents who held a










Explicit risk disclosure 0.271* 0.267* 1,075.7 0.543**
[1.80] [1.70] [0.73] [1.98]
Regulatory certification 0.488*** 0.222 445.0 0.080
[2.96] [1.22] [0.33] [0.27]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 562 562 121 562
R2 0.15 0.12 0.34 0.13
F-statistic 3.72 2.66 1.12 2.58
Panel E: Interaction analysis balanced information  regulatory certification
Balanced information 
regulatory certification
0.252 0.311 1,101.4 0.316
[1.11] [1.23] [0.61] [0.75]
Balanced information 0.214 0.331** 1,227.6 0.669**
[1.32] [1.97] [0.90] [2.22]
Regulatory certification 0.014 0.079 1311.9 0.295
[0.08] [0.42] [1.16] [1.01]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 563 563 133 563
R2 0.10 0.12 0.30 0.12
F-statistic 8.97 2.16 1.02 2.67
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certification effects between the voluntary enrollment and marketing research bureau sub-
groups. We conduct interaction analysis in Table IV to assess the importance of these
effects, in which the voluntary enrollment group serves as the reference category.
We find that marketing research bureau (MRB) respondents exhibit on average greater
willingness to invest (Table IV Panels A and C), and lower risk perceptions (Table IV Panel
A), but the effect of risk factor disclosure does not vary with the origin of the respondent.
Similarly, the effect of regulatory certification (Table IV Panel A) does not vary with re-
spondent origin, which suggests that the impact of either participation incentives, regula-
tory reputation, or familiarity with regulatory duties is limited.
Effective protection of investors also requires understanding the extent to which sensi-
tivity to regulatory certification and disclosure varies with investor sophistication
(Campbell et al., 2011). Therefore, we interact the treatment variables with investor
wealth, investor education, and primary market investment experience. Table V indicates
that these characteristics do not alter our main results. However, the sample size in Table V
Panel C decreases because information about investor primary market investment experi-
ence has been collected in a separate survey.
Sensitivity to regulatory certification and risk factor disclosure is not driven by regula-
tory awareness, participation incentives, and investor sophistication or investor experience.
However, although factors such as overconfidence and financial literacy may affect the sen-
sitivity to regulatory certification and risk factor disclosure, we lack suitable data to reliably
test for these explanations.
4.4 Analysis of Prospectus Usage
Regulatory certification not only influences investors’ intentions to invest, but can also in-
crease the likelihood that investors consult the statutory prospectus due to increased aware-
ness of its availability. Conversely, investors may decide to delegate trust to the regulator,
rely on regulatory approval, and refrain from scrutinizing the prospectus themselves. We
analyze this issue by asking our respondents to indicate how likely they would be to read
the prospectus (Question 5 in the questionnaire).
Table VI reports that visually salient disclosure of risk factors (Model 4) and regulatory
certification (Model 5) decreases the likelihood that investors will consult the prospectus.
The interaction term in the final column indicates that simultaneous inclusion of these fac-
tors partially reverses the negative main effects. That regulatory certification has a negative
impact on prospectus usage is consistent with the delegated trust explanation. However,
the interaction term indicates that consultation regarding the prospectus is also explained
by the risks disclosed in the advertisement. Consistent with Mayzlin and Shin (2011),
advertising content influences subsequent search efforts for additional information. Note
that the verbally salient risk factor disclosure (Explicit Risk Disclosure) has no effect on
prospectus usage.
4.5 Within-Subject-Within-Offer Analysis
This section uses the within-subject-within-offer variation in our data set to estimate a
difference-in-differences model. As indicated, the first and third advertisements encoun-
tered by our respondents are different versions presenting the same offering. Therefore, all
the factors are constant except for the content of the advertisement and the experimentally
induced learning effects. We measure variations in disclosure content by six indicator
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Table IV. Regression analysis and interactions with respondent origin
This table contains the results for the OLS regressions. Panel A contains Regulatory
Certification measured as a dummy that is equal to one if a salient reference to the regulator is
included in the advertisement and zero otherwise. Panel B contains Explicit Risk Disclosure
measured as a dummy that is equal to one if the risk description contains the word “risk” and
zero otherwise. Panel C contains Balanced Information measured as a dummy that is equal to
one if the risk factor disclosure is included in the salient section of the advertisement and zero
otherwise. Marketing Research B (MRB for short) is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the
respondent is part of the panel of the marketing research bureau and zero otherwise. The vol-
untary enrollment group serves as a reference category. The dependent variables are Risk
Perception (Question 4) measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “not risky at all” to 7
“very risky,” Willingness-to-invest (Question 1) measured on a seven-point scale ranging from
1 “certainly not investing” to 7 “certainly investing,” Consult Other Information (Question 2)
measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “certainly not consulting other information”
to 7 “certainly consulting other information,” and Amount Invested (Question 3a) measured on
a continuous scale ranging between 0 and 25,000 euros. The questionnaire can be found in the
Appendix. First round responses are used and the control variables are listed in Table I. Robust
t-statistics are reported in brackets. Significance is indicated by ***, **, and * at the 1%, 5%,









Panel A: Interaction analysis respondent origin  regulatory certification
Regulatory certification 0.243* 0.186 257.8 0.039
[1.87] [1.45] [0.22] [0.16]
Origin(MRB)  Regulatory certification 0.120 0.057 1735.3 0.220
[0.73] [0.33] [1.29] [0.72]
Marketing research bureau 0.226* 0.360*** 1410.9 0.271
[1.94] [2.93] [1.30] [1.24]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 1125 1125 254 1125
R2 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.08
F-statistic 24.07 2.90 1.66 3.34
Panel B: interaction analysis respondent origin  explicit risk disclosure
Explicit risk disclosure 0.481** 0.280 741.6 0.727**
[2.38] [1.51] [0.36] [2.10]
Origin(MRB)  Explicit risk disclosure 0.395 0.218 134.7 0.522
[1.63] [0.89] [0.06] [1.20]
Marketing research bureau 0.080 0.263 1245.7 0.559*
[0.41] [1.45] [1.16] [1.84]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 562 562 121 562
R2 0.11 0.10 0.26 0.11
F-statistic 2.68 2.43 1.52 2.57
Panel C: Interaction analysis respondent origin  balanced information
Balanced information 0.067 0.166 1218.8 0.649*
[0.41] [0.91] [0.71] [1.84]
(continued)
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dummies that capture differences between the first and third round advertisements.9 Our
dependent variables are calculated by subtracting the third round responses from the first
round responses, and (unreported) the descriptive statistics confirm that response behavior
varies systematically with the treatment conditions.10 We add dummies for offering type
and the advertisement encountered in the first and second rounds to control for the learning
effects.
Table VII confirms that the presence or absence of regulatory certification significantly
affects response behavior and dominates the effect of the risk factor disclosure. The add-
ition (removal) of salient regulatory certification decreases (increases) risk perceptions by
6% (5.2%) and increases (decreases) the willingness to invest by 17.1% (8.1%). The other
treatments are insignificant although their coefficients are in agreement with our hypothe-
ses; consistent investors attach substantial weight to the presence or absence of regulatory
certification.
4.6. Additional Robustness Analyses
In this section, we discuss the outcomes of several of the additional analyses we performed.
First, by adding willingness to invest to the prospectus usage and information search model,
we investigate whether investors lose interest in the offering if risks are saliently disclosed.
If willingness to invest precedes the intention to search for information, then advertisements
with salient risk disclosure yield a lower average willingness to invest in the presence of
declining investor interest. Information search behavior is slightly lower for the groups who
received salient risk disclosure (6.3 of 7) as compared to the reference group (6.5 of 7). The
regressions in Tables A.III and A.IV of the Online Appendix indicate that willingness to in-
vest has a positive effect on prospectus usage or searches for other information. Willingness
to consult other information is lower for both risk treatments, but the positive interaction
term indicates that the effects of risk disclosure are lower for investors who are more inter-
ested in the offering.
Next, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the specification of the regression










Origin(MRB)  Balanced information 0.032 0.018 443.8 0.223
[0.14] [0.07] [0.22] [0.50]
Marketing research bureau 0.274 0.412** 1271.6 0.131
[1.61] [2.19] [0.92] [0.41]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 563 563 133 563
R2 0.08 0.11 0.24 0.11
F-statistic 13.69 2.33 1.71 2.53
9 Regulatory seal “on” indicates that the reference was lacking from the first round advertisement
and is included in the third round advertisement, while “off” means it is excluded in the third round
and included in the first round.
10 The results can be obtained from the authors.
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Table V. Regulatory certification and investor characteristics
This table contains results for the OLS regressions. Panel A contains Household Wealth >
150,000 measured as a dummy that is equal to one if the household’s financial wealth, exclud-
ing real estate, exceeds e150,000 and zero otherwise. Panel B contains College/University
Education measured as a dummy that is equal to one if the respondent completed their educa-
tion at the college or university level and zero otherwise. Panel C contains Primary Market
Investor measured as a dummy variable that is equal to one if the respondent has prior experi-
ence with investing in the primary market and zero otherwise. Regulatory Certification is a
dummy variable that is equal to one if a salient reference to the regulator is included in the ad-
vertisement and zero otherwise. The dependent variables are Risk Perception (Question 4)
measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “not risky at all” to 7 “very risky,”
Willingness-to-invest (Question 1) measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “certainly
not investing” to 7 “certainly investing,” Consult Other Information (Question 2) measured on a
seven-point scale ranging from 1 “certainly not consulting other information” to 7 “certainly
consulting other information,” and Amount Invested (Question 3a) measured on a continuous
scale ranging between e0 and 25,000. The questionnaire is contained in the Appendix. First
round responses are used and the control variables are listed in Table I. Robust t-statistics are










Panel A: Interaction with household wealth
Regulatory certification 0.336*** 0.256*** 1133.2* 0.118
[3.96] [2.79] [1.86] [0.76]
Household wealth > e150.000 0.084 0.023 368.9 0.085
[0.40] [0.10] [0.18] [0.26]
Regulatory certification 
Household wealth > e150.000
0.107 0.260 1304.3 0.205
[0.42] [0.85] [0.74] [0.43]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 1125 1125 254 1125
R2 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.08
F-statistic 19.50 2.29 1.63 3.27
Panel B: Interaction with education level
Regulatory certification 0.353*** 0.233 1114.2 0.106
[2.71] [1.61] [1.17] [0.44]
College/university education 0.195 0.091 20.31 0.472
[1.20] [0.53] [0.01] [1.51]
Regulatory certification 
college/university education
0.051 0.023 3.982 0.310
[0.31] [0.13] [0.00] [1.03]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 1125 1125 254 1125
R2 0.081 0.072 0.14 0.09
F-statistic 28.55 2.73 1.50 3.20
(continued)
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e25,000 endowment and estimate Heckman regressions to account for response selection.
Our results remain similar in these alternative specifications (see Table A.V in the Online
Appendix).11 Using ordered logit regressions for the ordinal variables, we again find similar
results (see Table A.VI in the Online Appendix).
We also consider the possibility that respondents grasped the objectives of the experi-
ment as they progressed through the questions. Moreover, respondents may have become
less responsive due to fatigue. It is also conceivable that the lack of participation incentives
had a more pronounced effect on our results as the study progressed. To assess the general
impact of these explanations, we analyze the second- and third-round responses of the ex-
periment. If respondents became either tired or aware of experimental objectives, then we
would expect the treatment effects to diminish. Conversely, analysis time increases in ex-
planatory power due to lower patience and interest. Finally, investors who failed to partici-
pate truthfully in the study may have caused inconsistent results across rounds or
differences in distributions, which is reflected in the standard errors of the coefficients.
The analysis of the second and third rounds (Table A.VII of the Online Appendix and
Table A.VIII of the Online Appendix, respectively) responses indicates that the explanatory
power of analysis time increases as the experiment progresses, as consistent with a fatigue
effect. However, the regulatory certification effect remains strong and significant, and the
regression coefficients and standard errors are similar across rounds. This latter finding mit-
igates our concerns that weak participation incentives lead to sabotaging answer behavior.
Finally, we assume throughout the study that respondents have not underreacted to our
treatments due to the impression of being deliberately manipulated (Campbell, 1995).
Feelings of deliberate manipulation were unlikely to affect first round responses as respond-
ents had no reference material, while our second and third round effects indicate that our










Panel C: Interaction with primary market investment experience
Regulatory certification 0.335*** 0.247** 2113.3*** 0.112
[3.30] [2.30] [2.75] [0.60]
Primary market investor 0.057 0.554** 202.6 0.154
[0.34] [2.42] [0.15] [0.45]
Regulatory certification  primary market investor 0.035 0.297 1577.6 0.666
[0.14] [1.01] [0.87] [1.57]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 845 845 186 845
R2 0.08 0.09 0.21 0.10
F-statistic 37.16 2.53 2.62 5.81
11 We estimate a two-stage Heckman procedure, but lack data on a suitable instrument. Thus, our
model is identified from the nonlinearity of the Mills ratio resulting in noisy and inflated first-stage
standard errors (Puhani, 2000). As such, the Mills ratio might not adequately capture a selection
effect and we are cautious in deriving definite conclusions from this analysis.
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well-specified, given that responses to the open questions reveal respondents having recog-
nized changes in risk disclosure.
5. Discussion
In this section, we discuss the policy, welfare, external validity, and generalizability of our
results. As noted in the introduction, the expectation that rational investors should not
react to the presence of regulatory oversight is arguable. Even if all offerings disclosed the
presence of regulatory oversight equally, the informative value of regulatory certification
may still obtain. This emerges as a function of the market structure, which is composed of
both exempted and a nonexempted securities offering. As an example, suppose that an in-
vestor can choose from an exempted and nonexempted offering. The presence of regulatory
approval provides limited information for nonexempted offerings because the regulatory
requirements are homogeneous for these deals. However, if investors compare non-
exempted against exempted offerings, then disclosing the presence of supervision may pro-
vide valuable signals about the quality of the information provided, risk of fraud or even to
Table VI. Analysis of usage of the statutory prospectus
This table contains results for the OLS regressions. The dependent variable Do you consider
reading the prospectus (Question 5) is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1
“certainly not considering reading the prospectus” to 7 “certainly considering reading the pros-
pectus.” Explicit Risk Disclosure is a dummy that is equal to one if the risk description contains
the word “risk” and zero otherwise. Balanced Information is a dummy that is equal to one if
risk disclosure is included in the salient section of the advertisement and zero otherwise.
Regulatory Certification is a dummy that is equal to one if a salient reference to the regulator is
included in the advertisement and zero otherwise. The questionnaire is contained in the
Appendix. Third round responses are used and the control variables are listed in Table II.
Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. Significance is indicated by ***, **, and * at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Do you consider reading the prospectus?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regulatory certification 0.066 0.092 0.533**
[0.57] [0.40] [2.18]











Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 1125 562 562 563 563
R2 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07
F-statistic 6.44 1.89 1.80 3.22 3.40
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a limited extent on economic fundamentals. Moreover, nonexempted offerings are hetero-
geneous on dimensions such as the type of offering and the issuer. Nonexempted offerings
that resemble exempted offerings, for example due to the size or type of issuer, may benefit
more from regulatory approval compared to nonexempted securities offerings by well-
known (blue-chip) companies that have lower asymmetric information. Despite the exclu-
sion of these conditions from our experimental setup, we cannot completely rule out that
past experiences with exempted offerings may drive subjects’ responses.
This consideration raises the question: Would regulating references to regulatory over-
sight or standardizing this disclosure eliminate any welfare losses as compared to the cur-
rent situation? Although the discriminatory value of regulatory oversight may be reduced
by regulating disclosure or removing exemptions to the prospectus regime, these types of
interventions may introduce new inefficiencies to the market. This may be the case if regu-
latory approval acts as a decision heuristic for investors. Regulating the disclosure of regu-
latory oversight may perceptually give nonexempted offerings an advantage over exempted
offerings. If issuers of exempted offerings want to raise capital at attractive terms, then they
may want to restructure their offering to become nonexempted. This can be achieved by
increasing the offer size to exceed e2.5 million as this threshold requires the publication of
Table VII. Difference-in-differences analysis
This table contains the results for the OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the differ-
ence measured as response first round – response third round of Risk Perception (Question 4),
Willingness-to-invest (Question 1), and Consult Information (Question 2). The explanatory vari-
ables are dummy variables that are equal to one if the treatment was included (on) or excluded
(off) in the third round as compared with the first round and zero otherwise. The questionnaire
is can be found in the Appendix. The type of advertisement and the second round treatment are
included as control variables. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. Significance is indi-
cated by ***, **, and * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
D(Risk perception) D(Willingness-to-invest) D(Consult information)
Regulatory seal “on” 0.329*** 0.385*** 0.012
[4.05] [4.83] [0.10]
Regulatory seal “off” 0.284*** 0.183** 0.135
[3.42] [2.15] [1.03]
Explicit risk disclosure “on” 0.118 0.144 0.047
[1.02] [1.23] [0.31]
Explicit risk disclosure “off” 0.077 0.098 0.055
[0.69] [0.85] [0.32]
Balanced information “on” 0.091 0.142 0.255
[0.82] [1.28] [1.60]
Balanced information “off” 0.015 0.002 0.140
[0.13] [0.02] [0.90]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 1,125 1,125 1,125
R2 0.06 0.07 0.01
F-statistic 2.60 2.82 1.20
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an approved prospectus. If offering sizes become driven by regulatory requirements rather
than by economic opportunities, then a suboptimal allocation of capital may result in new
welfare losses. Similarly, the removal of exemptions to the prospectus regime would elimin-
ate the discriminatory value of approval, albeit at the disadvantage of introducing new
supervision costs and increasing the barriers to access in the capital market. Finally, invest-
ors can be educated to increase their understanding of financial market supervision; how-
ever, such initiatives are costly and may have only limited effects (Fernandes, Lynch, and
Netemeyer, 2014). Hence, no obvious policy interventions exist that would yield improve-
ments upon the current situation without potentially introducing new inefficiencies.
Therefore, the further regulation of advertising content, especially on risk disclosure, may
be a starting point in providing more balanced information to investors (Shaton, 2017).
Next, we discuss the external validity of our findings. The simplified decision envir-
onment and survey-experimental approach that we use to collect data may lead to an
over- or underestimating of the effects and the precision and validity of our results. The
validity of survey experiments is partly driven by the use of a representative sample and
the random assignment to treatment groups (Barabas and Jerit, 2010) and both condi-
tions are fulfilled in our research design. In their examination of returns disclosure,
Beshears et al. (2017) show that minor variations in experimental context can lead to
markedly different decision outcomes. This finding emphasizes the importance of closely
mimicking the actual decision environment, and we therefore developed treatments close-
ly aligned with actual offerings. Moreover, our results show that minor variations in in-
formation saliency and wording of (risk factor) disclosure affect the response behavior
of participants, which is consistent with our hypotheses and studies based on field data
(Beshears et al., 2017) or field experiments (Bertrand et al., 2010). Several studies also
indicate that survey experiments (e.g., vignette studies) provide valid results for the pre-
diction of actual risky decision behavior (East, 1993; Weber and Milliman, 1997;
Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto, 2015).
Finally, it should be noted that regulatory certification may be referred to in multiple in-
formation channels (e.g., brochures and investor meetings). As such, investors may encoun-
ter the same stimulus multiple times, thereby reinforcing its effects, while the complexity of
the actual information environment may dilute its stand-alone value. Therefore, we posit a
value in future research for analyzing the interaction between multiple sources of informa-
tion to provide additional insights into the incremental effects of regulatory certification on
investor behavior. The risks created by regulatory certification are not merely hypothetical,
as evidenced by the fact that European financial regulators took action to reduce unjustified
references to regulatory oversight in marketing materials. This development confirms our
findings entailing actual behavior by capital raising firms, but also points toward the gener-
alizability of our findings outside the Dutch capital markets. Admittedly, regulatory certifi-
cation effects are most likely to be found in those offerings directly targeted toward
individual investors because no other trust-enhancing activities by intermediaries or wealth
managers are performed. The absence of external scrutiny of these offerings raises the risk
that investors are manipulated by offerors who include framed information on regulatory
prospectus approval. Moreover, an extensive body of research shows the impact of external
reviews on economic behavior (Zhu and Zhang, 2010). It is therefore likely that the effects
documented in this article are generalizable to other (regulated) markets where third-party
review is present.
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6. Conclusions
Certification by trusted third parties such as bankers, auditors, and selling shareholders can
assist investors in assessing the quality and motives for security offerings in conditions of
asymmetric information. We examine whether a similar effect obtains through salient refer-
ences in advertisements to regulatory approval of the prospectus, referred to as “regulatory
certification.” Financial market supervision is widespread, but its effects on investor behav-
ior are insufficiently understood. Despite being essentially only informative about compli-
ance with basic disclosure requirements, prospectus approval can, for example, be
construed as an approval of the offering itself. Limited knowledge about regulatory duties
combined with an overload of information increase investors’ vulnerability to these certifi-
cation effects. We observe that in contrast to regulatory certification, fundamental informa-
tion, for example on risk factors, is often disclosed with low visual and verbal saliency.
This factor may decrease the attention that investors spend on these attributes despite their
importance for investment decision making.
Using a survey experiment, we find that the addition of salient references to regulatory
oversight in advertisements decreases the perceived riskiness of the offering and increases
the willingness to invest by as much as 17%. Experienced investors appear to delegate trust
to the regulator and spend less effort searching for additional information when salient
regulatory certification is present. Sensitivity to regulatory certification is not affected by in-
vestor experience or investor sophistication and regulatory certification does not increase
prospectus usage. Risk factors that are verbally and visually saliently disclosed contribute
to higher risk perceptions and decrease the intention to search for additional information.
Our findings contribute to the literature on certification signals in securities offerings
(Booth and Smith, 1986; Megginson and Weiss, 1991) and deepen our understanding of
the side effects of regulation. If unsophisticated investors misinterpret the meaning of regu-
latory certification, then issuers can use this observation to successfully market their secur-
ities to investors, especially if other trust-enhancing channels are absent. Further research is
needed to understand how these effects emerge given heterogeneous securities offerings. An
analysis of this type may shed light on the effectiveness of policies to counteract the exter-
nalities of regulation without creating new side effects. Since financial market regulation is
developed as a function of the market structure, significant research may result from
exploiting the homogeneity in European capital market regulations and the heterogeneity
in supervisory approaches across European countries. This setup can provide valuable
insights on the emergence of regulatory externalities as a function of supervision practices,
heterogeneity in market structure, and historical developments across countries.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary data are available at Review of Finance online.
Appendix
Questionnaire
After each advertisement in the experiment:
Question 1 (Willingness to invest):
Would you consider purchasing bonds from this fund?
Answer: 7-point scale: 1 certainly not investing—7 certainly investing.
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Question 2 (Consult other information):
Would you consult other sources of information before you consider investing in this bond?
Answer: 7-point scale: 1 certainly not consulting other information—7 certainly consulting
other information.
Question 3a (Amount invested) (if response to question 2 > 3):
Suppose that you have 25,000 euros available for investment purposes. How much would
you be willing to invest in this proposition?
Answer: amount ranging from 0 euros to 25,000 euros.
Question 3 b (Reason not investing) (if response to question 2 £ 3):
Why would you not consider investing in the proposition?
Answer: open.
Question 4 (Risk perception):
How risky do you consider this proposition?
Answer: 7-point scale: 1 not risky at all—7 very risky.
Exit question (after all advertisements have been shown)
Question 5 (Consider reading the prospectus):
Would you consider reading the prospectuses after watching these advertisements?
Answer: 7-point scale: 1 certainly not—7 certainly.
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